Carlyle Thayer is Emeritus Professor at The University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra and Director of Thayer Consultancy, a small business registered in Australia. He is also a member of the South China Sea NewsWire Advisory Board. This interview was conducted on August 19, 2024.
1. How can the competing territorial claims and China’s escalating military presence in the South China Sea be resolved peacefully while ensuring freedom of navigation and respecting international law?
Territorial disputes involve conflicting claims to state sovereignty and sovereign jurisdiction. China continues to base its claims to indisputable sovereignty over the Nanhai Zhudao (South China Sea Islands) on the basis of historic discovery despite the ruling of a UN Arbitral Tribunal in 2016 that these claims had been superseded by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Territorial disputes in the South China Sea are intractable and are unlikely to be resolved peacefully under international law but these disputes can be managed to prevent sporadic incidents from escalating to armed conflict.
The littoral states, all members of ASEAN, have exercised self-restraint and ability to negotiate their differences. For example, Vietnam protested the Philippines’ recent claim for an extended continental shelf, arguing that it overlapped Vietnam’s entitlement, but nonetheless Vietnam was open to discussions.
China is the spoiler as it will continue to oppose bilateral agreements affecting its ambit claim to the South China Sea. China maintains a permanent presence in waters claimed by the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam. Chinese military pressure is mainly directed at the Philippines to pressure the Marcos Jr. Administration to back down from its heightened assertion of sovereignty in the West Philippine Sea.
China has been careful not to cross the threshold of an armed attack on Philippines public vessels so as not to trigger the United States to act under its Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines. The recent China-Philippines provisional agreement on resupply to Second Thomas Shoal is a positive first step.
It is necessary to distinguish freedom of navigation under customary international law and U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operational Patrols. The former concerns the rights of all maritime powers to sail on the high seas. The latter is specifically aimed at challenging what the United States claims are excessive claims under UNCLOS.
Freedom of navigation involving world shipping through the South China Sea has been undisturbed by China’s escalating military presence. China harasses and intimidates Philippines military, coast guard and other public vessels, thus interfering in their right to freedom of navigation. China also interferes with oil and gas exploration activities in disputed waters of littoral states involving foreign (non-regional) vessels.
China monitors and routinely protests these patrols. While there have been sporadic incidents in the past, China and the United States military representatives have resumed discussions to ensure maritime safety.
2. Can Track 2 diplomacy efforts succeed or have China’s actions, especially in the Philippines, made this impossible?
Track 2 diplomacy serves to sensitize academic participants about the nuance of the issues in dispute and the views of opposing sides. This in turn may have a knock-on effect as Track 2 participants interact with government officials and circulate their proposals on the way forward.
Track 1.5 diplomacy offers a better venue as government officials attend in their private capacity. They gain direct insights into the issues and differences under discussion.
Track 2 diplomacy is suited to periods of heightened tension when diplomacy at the official level is under strain or suspended. The bottom line, however, is that both Track 2 and Track 1.5 diplomacy are necessary but not sufficient to resolve contentious maritime disputes in the South China Sea. There must be political will and agreement on rule, if not international law, by the government officials of the states concerned.
3. Almost seven years ago (2017), a network established by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) SCS experts developed a blueprint for fisheries management and environmental cooperation, have any of those recommendations been adopted by claimant nations?
ASEAN member states cooperate under the umbrella of the ASEAN Sectoral Working Group on Fisheries (ASWGF). The ASWGF drew up a Strategic Plan of Action for ASEAN Cooperation on Fisheries for 2016-2020 a year before the 2017 blueprint. It is likely that there was an interactive process between South China Sea specialists and government officials at that time and subsequently.
Eight ASEAN states individually and China made submissions that formed the Single Draft Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) Negotiating Text (SDNT) adopted in August 2018. The SDNT contains a section on Basic Undertakings that considers (i) the duty to cooperate and (ii) promotion of practical maritime cooperation. It is notable that five countries (Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Philippines and Singapore) all proposed marine environmental protection and marine scientific research. These are two of the proposals included in the 2002 Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.
4. Do you have any views on whether we will see any marine science cooperation or workshops in the region?
There have been two recent developments of note. First, Thailand hosted the 2nd UN Ocean Decade Regional Conference and the 11th WESTPAC International Marine Science Conference from April 22-25 this year. The two conferences were organised by UNESCO’s Intergovernmental Oceanographic Sub-Commission for the Western Pacific and attracted 1,200 delegates from forty countries. A Special Forum on the South China Sea reviewed recent project findings for local management.
Second, Filipino marine scientists held a forum on Science Diplomacy at the University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies in July 2024. The hosts noted that greater efforts were necessary to monitor and manage coral reefs in the West Philippines Sea and it was counterproductive to exclude China from these efforts. Marine scientists from the Center for Integrative and Development Studies were assisting the Department of Environment and Natural Resources designate marine protected areas in the Kalayaan Group of Islands.
5. How is AUKUS contributing to the peace and stability of the region and complementing the regional architecture?
AUKUS is a tri-party pact comprising two pillars. Pillar one is to provide eight nuclear powered submarines to Australia. Pillar 2 promotes collaboration in cutting edge national defence technologies. In sum, AUKUS contributes to regional peace and security by providing Australia with an enhanced conventional capability to deter China from using armed force against Australia and its interests.
The United States and the United Kingdom will deploy nuclear attack submarines to Australia on a rotational basis under AUKUS. No regional state in Southeast Asia has nuclear weapons. US and UK nuclear attack submarines will serve as a deterrent to China’s growing offensive nuclear capabilities. Regional peace and stability in maritime Southeast Asia are being threatened by China’s military rise, construction of military bases in the Paracel and Spratly Islands, and the deployment of the China Coast Guard, Maritime Militia and fishing fleets to the Exclusive Economic Zones of littoral states.
AUKUS serves to prevent China from resorting to nuclear blackmail against Australia, but AUKUS does not have the capability to deter conventional Chinese aggression.
6. What are your primary concerns as China continues to step up military and political pressure against democratically-governed Taiwan?
Xi Jinping has directed the People’s Liberation Army to develop the capability to seize Taiwan by military force by 2027. Repeated large-scale Chinese military exercises in and around Taiwan appear to observers as dress rehearsals for how an attack on Taiwan would be executed.
My primary concern is that a number of developments might embolden China to resort to force against Taiwan. Three scenarios come to mind (1) a Russian victory in Ukraine whether through force of arms or the collapse of Western support, (2) conflict in the South China Sea that escalates, and (3) U.S. disengagement from Southeast Asia.
