By Erik Lenhart and Michael Tkacik
Recent developments underscore a troubling pattern of Chinese “wolf warrior” diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific. On November 8, 2025, Japan’s Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could constitute a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan, potentially justifying collective self-defense measures. This reflects Japan’s official position, echoing Shinzo Abe’s well-established stance from 2021 and aligning with former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s warning at the 2023 Shangri-La Dialogue that “the Ukraine of today could be East Asia of tomorrow.” In response, the Chinese Consulate in Osaka issued an aggressive social media statement targeting Takaichi, part of a broader trend of coercive tactics aimed at silencing Japan’s legitimate security concerns.
Taiwan is located only 111 kilometers from Japan’s Yonaguni Island. Any kinetic conflict would disrupt maritime trade and impact millions of Japanese citizens. It would cut off Japan’s vital sea lines of communication and 90 percent of its energy supplies. Given the increased Chinese Coast Guard intrusions into Japanese territorial waters and airspace around the Senkakus since 2012, Tokyo’s security concerns are not hypothetical. China’s behavior threatens Japan’s economic stability and democratic resilience.
If China were to take control of Taiwan, it would break out of the First Island Chain’s containment, putting the U.S., Japan, and their democratic allies at a disadvantage. Takaichi’s statement is not provocative; it simply exposes the truth, recognizing China’s consistent policy since at least 2012 from gray-zone operations to military exercises simulating encirclement and invasion of Taiwan, changing the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. China is a revisionist state.
History Offers Clear Precedents
U.S. Ambassador to Japan George Glass, responded sharply, saying the move showed that “the mask slips, again.” His remarks reflect a growing concern in Washington and regional capitals that China is once more turning to economic pressure as a geopolitical tool against its neighbors or even beyond Asia. South Korea faced economic retaliation over the THAAD deployment in 2017. Australia was targeted for calling for a COVID-19 origins investigation in 2020. So too, Japan has experienced Chinese pressure: After a 2010 fishing boat collision near the Senkakus, China withheld rare earth exports. In 2012, following the Japanese government’s purchase of three Senkaku Islands from a private owner, China escalated with further pressure tactics including Japanese goods boycotts.
What Can We Expect?
A meeting on November 17, 2025, between Masaaki Kanai, director-general of the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, and Liu Jinsong, head of the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s Department of Asian Affairs, reinforced each country’s respective position with no headway, and Japanese media report that officials in Tokyo are bracing for a protracted standoff.
Conversely, the Japanese National Police Agency has confirmed there is no evidence of deteriorating public safety in Japan, with violent crimes against Chinese nationals actually decreasing from 80 cases in 2023 to 68 in 2024. However, there have been several cases of Japanese nationals, including schoolchildren, attacked in China amid rising anti-Japanese sentiment fueled by state media, ultra-nationalistic online rhetoric, and propaganda movies that often take liberties with historical grievances to stoke hatred. Recent events include the fatal stabbing of a 10-year-old Japanese boy near a Japanese school in Shenzhen in September 2024, and a knife attack on a Japanese mother and her preschool-aged child in Suzhou in June 2024, which also killed a Chinese bus attendant who intervened. In response, Japan has warned its citizens in China to heighten safety precautions and avoid crowds as tensions escalate.
It appears Beijing is returning to its 2010 playbook in 2025. In recent days, China has issued a public advisory warning its citizens to avoid travel to Japan citing what is called a rise in crimes targeting Chinese nationals. Beijing has also notified Tokyo that it is suspending Japanese seafood imports and has postponed the release of at least two Japanese movies. Further Chinese economic pressure tactics and heightened incursions into Japanese territorial waters and airspace around the Senkakus are likely to follow. In this context, Japanese economic security minister Kimi Onoda rightfully warned: “It is risky to depend too heavily on a country that immediately resorts to economic coercion whenever it encounters something it dislikes. Ideally, we should always be thinking about how to keep the economy running in ways that reduce such risks.”
What Needs to Be Done?
Since the revision of its three key security documents under Kishida in December 2022, Japan is no longer idle and has been increasing defensive capabilities, such as a prototype electromagnetic railgun tested in summer 2025 aboard the JS Asuka, capable of firing projectiles at Mach 7 (2,300 meters per second) to counter China’s hypersonic missiles like the DF-17. The railgun presents a low-cost potential to offset China’s massive missile magazine advantage in the Indo-Pacific. Japan is developing next-generation missiles, including the HVGP Block II hypersonic glide vehicle set for 2030 deployment with a 3,000-kilometer range, and modular long-range anti-ship missiles powered by turbojet engines for island defense, enhancing strike reliability through AI coordination. These advancements aim to deter Chinese hegemonic ambitions in the Western Pacific.
To complement these domestic efforts, Japan should lead and deepen international alliances, integrating its enhanced capabilities into joint exercises, technology-sharing initiatives, and coordinated deterrence strategies with partners to collectively counter China’s assertiveness.
Quad members and like-minded partners, such as the Republic of Korea and the Philippines, must strengthen cooperation to boost supply chain resilience and deterrence, upholding the status quo and rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. Closer NATO-Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) collaboration in maritime security and cybersecurity is welcome, including safeguards for sea lines of communication and deep-sea cable infrastructure. Combating disinformation and hybrid warfare from authoritarian states is vital, through joint efforts to counter false narratives via state-controlled media, social media platforms, and cyber operations that divide allies, undermine democracies, and justify aggression in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea. Essential measures include enhanced intelligence sharing, public awareness campaigns, and technological defenses against deepfakes and bot networks.
Erik Lenhart (erik.lenhart1@gmail.com) holds an MA in political science from Charles University. He is a former Deputy Chief of Mission of the Slovak Republic in Tokyo and the author of the novel Daughters of the Empire.
Michael Tkacik (mtkacik@sfasu.edu) holds a PhD from the University of Maryland and a JD from Duke University. He is a professor of government and director of the School of Honors at Stephen F. Austin State University in Texas.
