By Erik Lenhart and Michael Tkacik
“Japan is back,” declared Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi at her diplomatic debut during the 47th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur. Echoing the legacy of her late mentor Shinzo Abe, she reaffirmed Japan’s commitment to the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy and pledged deeper cooperation with ASEAN in maritime security, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and disaster response. The summit concluded with a joint statement endorsing FOIP and a proposal for a Japan-ASEAN AI initiative focused on human resource development and technological collaboration.
Takaichi’s diplomatic momentum continued during U.S. President Donald Trump’s visit to Tokyo from October 27–29. The two leaders signed several key agreements, including:
— A bilateral trade deal reducing U.S. tariffs on Japanese goods to 15% (down from the threatened 25%) in exchange for Japan’s pledge to invest $550 billion in U.S. industry and open its markets to American rice, cars, and defense equipment.
— A critical minerals framework to secure supply chains for rare earths and strategic resources, countering China’s export restrictions.
— A missile procurement agreement for Japan’s F-35 fighter jets and a memorandum on shipbuilding cooperation.
Trump praised Takaichi as “one of the great prime ministers” and “an ally at the strongest level,” while Takaichi nominated him for the Nobel Peace Prize, citing his role in brokering ceasefires in Thailand-Cambodia and the Middle East.
Unlike her predecessor Shigeru Ishiba—whose tenure was marked by missteps like the ill-fated Asian NATO proposal and awkward historical commentary—Takaichi offers clarity and continuity. She builds on the legacy of Abe, Suga, and Kishida by strengthening ties with the U.S., Quad partners, and ASEAN. Her rapport with Trump mirrors Abe’s strategic charm diplomacy, complete with symbolic gifts and gestures that reinforce personal ties.
Takaichi’s approach to South Korea is pragmatic. While the Kishida-Yoon “bromance” emphasized personal chemistry, Takaichi and President Lee Jae-myung are pursuing shuttle diplomacy grounded in mutual interests. At the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in South Korean Gyeongju, both leaders kept the meeting cordial, keenly aware of the importance of bilateral and trilateral cooperation with the U.S. Whether she can mend Quad tensions—particularly between the U.S. and India—remains to be seen.
Her greatest challenge lies in managing relations with China—Japan’s top trading partner and its most pressing security concern. From gray zone incursions near the Senkaku Islands to economic coercion and arbitrary detentions of Japanese citizens, tensions remain high. Abe’s 2018 state visit to Beijing marked a high point in engagement, but COVID-era setbacks have left ties strained. The growing Russia-DPRK military nexus further complicates the regional landscape, posing dilemmas not only for Japan and South Korea but also for China. During her first meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the margins of APEC, Takaichi stated her desire to confirm the general course of relations between China and Japan. According to her, this entails fostering a partnership based on shared strategic goals and creating strong, positive bonds.
Beyond diplomacy, Takaichi has been proactive on the security agenda. Her intention to expedite Japan’s military development and increase defense spending to 2 percent of GDP by fiscal year 2025—two years ahead of the Kishida administration’s 2022 target—is a significant step toward boosting national security. Defense received roughly 9.9 trillion yen in the first fiscal year 2025 budget; to reach the 2 percent target, a supplemental budget of 1 trillion yen would be needed.
Domestically, Takaichi governs with a minority coalition alongside the Japan Innovation Party, following Komeito’s exit after 26 years. This shift may liberate Japan’s defense policy from Komeito’s pacifist constraints, potentially revitalizing the domestic arms industry and enabling deeper security cooperation with allies.
Her rise as Japan’s first female prime minister is historic, though not unprecedented in ambition. Figures like Yuriko Koike and Tomomi Inada once vied for similar roles, often espousing more hardline views. Takaichi, by contrast, blends conservative values with neo-Keynesian economics, aligning more with European social democrats than libertarians like Javier Milei or Alice Weidel.
Despite alarmist portrayals of Takaichi as far-right, her early tenure has been marked by moderation, realism, and strategic foresight. Her reappointment of well-respected veteran negotiator Toshimitsu Motegi as foreign minister signals continuity and pragmatism. Known for his calm, results-driven diplomacy, Motegi’s return may help Japan navigate turbulent waters with steadiness. Her balanced approach was evident in her latest remarks about Sino-Japanese relations. She labeled Beijing “an important neighbor” and stressed the need for “constructive and stable” and “mutually beneficial” relations, even as she voiced “deep concern” about the security implications of China’s growing military operations.
Whether Takaichi will enjoy Abe’s longevity or become another short-lived leader in Japan’s revolving door of prime ministers remains uncertain. But for now, the Indo-Pacific has a new voice—one that speaks with clarity, conviction, and purpose.
Erik Lenhart (erik.lenhart1@gmail.com) holds an MA in political science from Charles University and is a former Deputy Chief of Mission of the Slovak Republic in Tokyo.
Michael Tkacik (mtkacik@sfasu.edu) holds a PhD from the University of Maryland and a JD from Duke University. He is a professor of government and director of the School of Honors at Stephen F. Austin State University in Texas.
